This paper questions the recent recasting of fear within critical geopolitics. It identifies a widespread metanarrative, 'globalized fear', analysis of which lacks grounding and is remote, disembodied and curiously unemotional. A hierarchical scaling of emotions, politics and place overlooks agency, resistance and action.
I. Introduction
If the plethora of book titles in the early years of the twenty first century is anything to go by, fear is back in fashion (e.g. Bauman 2006; Bourke 2005; Furedi, 2005 Furedi, , 2006 Robin 2004; Schneier 2003) . That this level of analytical interest in fear exists at this particular time, and largely within the spaces of Anglo-American world, is not coincidental, but relates to a series of contemporary events. Most obviously, terrorist attacks in the west this century 1 and the war on/of terror 2 have sparked new interest in the politics and patterns of fear. Other global (or at least deterritorialized) issues, including some that are seen as related to terrorism, have also figured highly in the public imagination and on policy agendas. These include immigration and the threats it is perceived to pose to nation states; the possibility of deadly diseases which can travel rapidly across the world; global financial crises; and environmental destruction and, potentially, catastrophe (see Beck 2002; Hartmann et al 2005; Hujsmans 2006; Ingram 2008) . The context which these 'new' threats have entered is generally 1 regarded as a longer-standing 'risk culture' in western societies; the thesis runs that 'paranoid' or 'neurotic' citizens have become disproportionately anxious in everyday life, encouraged by government actions, scientists' claims and commercial interests (Beck 1992 (Beck , 1999 Furedi 2006; Isin 2004 ). While it is not usually analysed in detail (although Beck 1999 (although Beck , 2002 is an exception), it is the increasingly global nature of these issues which is held to be ratcheting up both risk and fear and the government and individual actions and practices that are held to be resulting.
This paper takes issue with this understanding of fear. I argue that a powerful metanarrative, which I call 'globalized fear', is present in academic work and the wider public sphere. These literatures have generated important insights, particularly the more critical and detailed accounts of the new geopolitics of fear which include contributions from political geographers (e.g. Katz 2007; Megoran 2005; Sparke 2007 ). However, the model of fear that provides the basis for these discussions is not always reflective of the ways that fear is felt, patterned and practiced in everyday life.
To engage in this critique may inevitably seem to set up the global/geopolitical and the local/everyday in a binary relationship, which is also the case in most of the literature reviewed here. In contrast, the aim of the paper is to critique the ways in which fear is constituted within the new geopolitics of fear literature, to dismantle the artificial scaling it suggests, and to point to a more insightful and empowering framework for understanding fear in the twenty-first century that is far more attentive to what is happening on 'the ground' in the places and lives that people inhabit. To this end, the paper draws throughout on recent feminist understandings of scale, global/local processes and geopolitics, and suggests how these might be combined with accounts of emotion. This provides one way of redressing the scaling-up of analysis of fear that has gradually taken place in recent decades -not reversing it, but finding new ways to refocus on different interconnected sites simultaneously.
First, some of the issues and themes in these new literatures on globalized fear are examined more closely. Next, in a critique of this literature, I suggest that the 'globalized fear' metanarrative tends to constitute fear as omnipresent and connected, yet at the same time analyses it remotely, lacking grounding, embodiment or emotion.
I then begin to outline what a call for an 'emotional geopolitics' might entail. I examine three areas of existing literature: critical research on fear of crime, feminist accounts of globalization and geopolitics, and emotional/affective geographies, each of which is largely ignored in the new geopolitics of fear literature. All offer relevant insights, and help underpin a more enabling framework for understanding fear against the backdrop of the war on/of terror. I go on to develop one agenda for an emotional geopolitics of fear that uses conscientization as a conceptual, epistemological and political tool. I conclude with some reflections on the separateness of various trajectories of knowledge production around the geopolitics of fear to date.
The literatures reviewed here use 'fear' in different ways; they variously analyse it as experiential, discursive, and/or political. What they have in common -and this underlies geographers' longstanding and recently diversifying interest in fear -is that they view fear as a social and spatial rather than purely psychological phenomenon.
Fear is defined throughout the paper as an emotional reaction to a perceived threat that always has social meaning, and which may have a range of positive and negative effects on social and spatial relations.
II. Globalized fear?
Few political spheres generate more fear and awe than the international. This is not only the case with key events such as wars or terrorist attacks, but also applies to the very nature of global politics. Consider how conventional realist approaches to foreign policy, which revolve around nation states seeking to maximise security, are in many ways political attempts to master and manipulate the awe-inspiring fear of the international and the conflicts it engenders.
(Bleiker and Leet 2006, 714) Feminist interventions question the disembodied masculinism of the [global] and interrogate the limits of local/global binaries, calling attention to the silenced, marginalized and excluded. In so doing, they observe that the local is often essentialized (Roberts 2004 )…the discourses of globalization hypermasculinized (Nagar et al. 2002) , and many forms of knowledge and social relations effaced. (Mountz and Hyndman 2006, 446) By 'globalized fear' I mean the powerful metanarrative that is currently popular in analyses of the relation of fear, terror and security 3 . There are two senses in which these metanarratives of fear can be considered to be 'global'. The first is the idea, more often implicit than worked through, that emotions are being produced and circulate on a global scale: this has become prominent within much recent political analysis of security and terror, including work in human geography. The second sense in which these explanations and processes are 'global' ones is that they tend to be prioritized and discussed as though they apply to everyone all of the time. In this section, I want to examine these two propositions in more detail.
A scaled history of the analysis of fear
Like the process of globalization itself, the metanarrative of globalized fear is not new, but gathered pace as the century turned. The last thirty years have seen a steady widening of the scale at which analysis of fear has taken place. The following brief historical caricature attempts to capture this scaling, though not all of the intricacies of academic analysis of fear. In the 1960s and 1970s, accounts of fear tended to be individualized and pathologized in social science (see Smith 1989 for a critique). By the 1980s, much empirical emphasis was on the neighbourhood as a unit of analysis (e.g. Taub 1984) . At the same time, feminist and other structuralist critiques became significant in diverting attention from individuals and environments towards the underlying social and political structures which breed fear, as well as mapping in rich detail the texture of fear in everyday lives (Crawford et al 1990; Pain 1991; Stanko 1990; Valentine 1989) . Critiques of moral panic and the governance of fear at the national scale were also increasingly evident (Hall et al 1978; May 1988) . Through the 1990s, such analyses of fear as discursive -as a political and cultural tool used by powerful groups within nation states to meet certain ends -gained further ground, becoming more prominent than empirical descriptions of the patterning of fear (Garland 1996; Lee 2007) . In the early years of the twenty-first century, the idea that governments are increasingly manufacturing, drawing upon and reproducing fear (at least, certain sorts of fears) has become the predominant focus of attention, though there are different emphases and perspectives in the literature. The suggestion that science and commerce have joined with public policy in encouraging a 'culture of 4 fear', a risk-averse condition which stimulates negative reactions by individuals (Furedi 2001 (Furedi , 2006 Glassner 1999) , has been eagerly taken up. Some go so far as to state that 'public policy and private life have become fear-bound; fear has become the emotion through which public life is administered ' (Bourke 2004, x) . Isin (2004) argues that Anglophone neoliberal state societies are now governed through neurosis, responding to and instilling fear in 'neurotic citizens'. For Isin, the 'culture of fear' actually argument underplays 'the fact that people not only conduct their lives with affects and emotions but also in the absence of capacities for evaluating full and transparent information' (Isin 2004, 220) . Such political use of fear is certainly not new, as Bourke's (2004) history shows (and nor is the outright dismissal of people's critical capacities). However, many would agree that 'there is something new about the specific architecture of fear that is now being crafted and…the specific 'we' it attempts to craft with it' (Weber 2006, 684, my emphasis) .
Globalized fear in the social sciences
Since 2001, a burgeoning literature has developed around globalized fear. In academic and public discourses, fear has become primarily focused on issues of international reach, such as immigration, disease and terrorism, rather than the concerns of previous decades with local everyday lives, bodies and places (Pain and Smith 2008b) . In accounts of the new geopolitics of fear (e.g. Bleiker and Leet 2006; Gregory and Pred 2007; Robin 2004; Sparke 2007) , fear is drawn into geopolitical governance and conflict. It is the transnational dimensions of fear that are of interest here: in this model, fear is produced and imagined rapidly and connectedly from one site in the world to another, directed and channelled by political agendas. The transmission between spaces and scales is often attributed to the mass media (Debrix 2008), with certain culturally proximate events, such as terrorist attacks on the west, receiving disproportionate ongoing attention because of their political and sociocultural utility (Mythen and Walklate 2006) . Indeed, the discourse of fear is so ubiquitous that it is often linked to these before there has been time to ascertain their actual emotional impacts (Altheide 2003) , and the media rarely specify exactly what it is that we actually fear (Poynting et al 2004) . Increasingly, this applies to issues ranging from panics about immigration flows to diseases such as SARS and avian flu, though the core theme has been the war on/of terror that has followed al-Qaeda Here fear and risk are woven together in particular ways, and fear has gained considerable currency as a way in which (geo)politics gets done:
Before 9/11, Americans were supposed to be in Eden, idling in a warm bath of social autism…Our fear of terrorism, orchestrated and manipulated by the powerful, is being used to reorganise the structure of power in American society, giving more to those who already have much and taking away from those who have little.
(Robin 2004, pp 1-2 and 25)
Globalized fear and human geography
The notion of the globalization of fear has, not unexpectedly, stimulated renewed interest in fear within human geography, and from new quarters of the discipline. 
III. A critique
Together, this body of work on the new geopolitics of fear is important in its analysis of geopolitical relations and the identification of unjust international and domestic policies. It is also important to point out its layering: it is multi-disciplinary, there is diversity in its approaches to theory and empirical evidence, and so it does not present a unified or harmonious canon of work. The critique below does not reflect doubt about the value of these lines of enquiry. Nor is it made simply to point out what is lacking and might be added on. Instead, my aim is to highlight some of the unintended consequences of theories that take fear for granted, and the political imperative for at least considering the perspectives of those who are supposedly 8 fearful, who do not currently constitute either collaborators or audience for much of this work. I also question why these (geopolitical) geographies of fear often seem so divorced from other (everyday) geographies of fear. I take issue with the frequently uncritical conceptualization and deployment of fear, the common assumptions about scale, and the lack of historicity that characterises some of this work. The second sense in which these explanations and emphases are 'global' is also problematic: fear tends to be prioritized and discussed as though it applies to everyone all of the time,
with little regard to social or spatial difference. There are assumptions that fear is, in the first place, in all of these accounts of globalized fear; as well as assumptions about the ways that emotions originate, travel and affect. Ironically, geographers have sometimes joined in the universalization of fear, applying it with a broad brush across a flat earth. Within this literature, there are five important weaknesses.
Fear? Whose fear?
The vast majority of the work cited so far examines and makes proposals about with it? How is it shaped and differentiated by varied lives, communities and places?
While the influential work of geographers such as Graham (2004) and Sparke (2007) is more nuanced, engagement with available analyses of grounded geopolitical fear is also lacking. Many political scientists tend to assume the effects of fear discourses in creating fearful masses (see Pain and Smith 2008b) .
A powerful critique by Crawford (2000) Crawford notes that 'theories of international politics and security depend on assumptions about emotions that are rarely articulated and which may not be correct' (Crawford 2000, 116) , and 'ironically the emotions that security scholars do accept as relevant -fear and hate -seem self-evidently important and are unproblematized.
This taken-for-granted status, especially of fear, has particularly pernicious effects' (118). I go on to identify some of these effects.
Globe talk: a scaled hierarchy of fear
The notion of the movement of fear in the bulk of the literature cited so far is a firmly Other in Australia to events at the national and global scale, but making clear that the experience as well as the discursive construction of fear is always layered and multifaceted. Sparke (2007, 338) points to the pressing need to ground our understandings of hopes and fears in particular spatial contexts 'in all their physical, social, economic cultural and political complexity'. He suggests that it is not enough to outline the geographies of dispossession which are reinforced by the ways the war on/of terror has unfolded; 'we need to learn to learn from the dispossessed about their hope-filled struggles to create geographies of repossession too' (Sparke 2007, 347; and see Pain and Smith 2008b) . In their collection on political violence and fear, Gregory and Pred (2007, 6) set out an agenda including the examination of 'how political violence compresses the sometimes forbiddingly abstract spaces of geopolitics and geoeconomics into the intimacies of everyday life and the innermost recesses of the human body'. However, any notion that the intimate and the everyday simply absorb global political violences and fears would be problematic. The task goes well beyond simply expanding the spaces and scales under consideration when charting the ways that politics has its effects. Indeed, and as the later discussion of feminist political geography will explore, there is a strong case for rupturing the very idea of these spaces and scales, because they tend to fix commanding notions about emotions, power, human agency and being (Pain and Smith 2008b; Pratt and Rosner 2006) .
Fear as a social and political construction
Global discourses of 'global' fear are also centrally about whiteness. They themselves are ordered by power geometries (see Tolia-Kelly 2007 after Massey 1993) . As Ling (2000, 242) pointed out in an earlier critique, the set of narratives underlying discussions of globalization 'recalls earlier relations between a colonial self and its native Other'. As they are presently construed, the subjects of rapidly moving global 
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The top down dialectic of discourse/experience, refracted through global/local and geopolitical/everyday, is too simple and has been contested for many years in the literatures I go on to explore. Alongside critiques of the war on/of terror and its oppressive policies, then, we might want to ask how people engage with global fear discourses, how everyday experiences of fear feed into these discourses, and how fear relates, interacts and circulates across these imagined scales of the abstract.
IV.
Framing an emotional geopolitics of fear 
Critical work on the fear of crime
The critical literature exploring the effects of fear of crime in everyday life developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Much is located in feminist social science including human geography, but it also includes ethnographic studies in sociology and criminology. It is characterised by the use of qualitative methodologies as well as carefully crafted local surveys, and tends to focus on the sharp divisions of well-being and marginality that fear reinforces, particularly around poverty, race, gender and place. As Megoran Here, fear is viewed as an emotion with embodied sensations and material implications. Fear inhabits people, and they, rather than ethereal, mobile or freefloating discourses, are the subject of empirical and analytical attention. Fear is also seen as situated and contextual, affected by local places and events as well as wider spatial settings (Loader et al 1998; Smith 1987 Smith , 1989 People also worry, feel angry, are bold, and hope, and all of these emotions are viewed as having the potential to be transformative (Koskela 1997) . Finally, fear is not a quantity or quality we can fully know, and cannot be assumed. One of the key points has been that those who are often the most fearful, for example certain groups of young people, are more likely to be victims of crime than offenders, and to be 
Feminist accounts of globalization and geopolitics
Scale is at the heart of problems with existing accounts of global fear. Feminist scholarship on globalization and geopolitics, though it has had little to say about emotion to date, offers some exciting possibilities for rethinking scale. It is not enough to consider how global processes play out at local scales, the angle taken in 'globe talk' where it diverges from asserting only the global (Marston et al 2005) .
Neither is it satisfactory to classify emotions as either locally-or globally-produced Her argument is that places and scales speak to and affect each other in both directions. Such arguments apply as well to fear, as there are contiguous rather than linear relationships between global processes and local topographies of emotion.
Recent work that specifically focuses on the war on/of terror puts these tenets into theory and practice. Hunt and Rygiel (2006) 
Emotional and affective geographies
The third body of literature that can help to frame an emotional geopolitics is recent work on emotional/affective geographies. The burgeoning area of emotional geographies has remained curiously separate from discussions in political geography.
More widely throughout the social sciences, it is argued that emotions need to have a far more prominent position in analysis of the socio-spatial world ( address two overlapping pathways that geographical analysis has taken.
First, a body of work broadly titled emotional geographies has, over the last few years, investigated the importance of emotions to social processes and landscapes, to subjective experiences of space and place, and to the policy arenas which affect them In recent responses to these criticisms, geographers have argued that affect can contribute far more to social geographies that attempt to be moral and engaged than 21 has been evident to date (see Lea 2009). Lim (2007) The tendency to distinguish between emotion and affect is challenged by Simonsen (2007) . In a refreshing account of a geography of practice, she emphasises the contextual, relational and multi-scalar nature of emotions; 'emotions are neither "actions" nor "passions" (understood as forces beyond our control that simply happen to us) -they are both at once' (177). She seeks to link social practices from bodily to transnational scales, by understanding how they 'meet up with moving and fixed materialities and form configurations that are continuously under transformation and negotiation' in particular places (179). Her account builds on both emotional and affective geographies, providing a more promising conceptualisation that might counter 'globalized fear'. In the next section, I outline another.
V. Towards an agenda for an emotional geopolitics of fear
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The particular conceptual, epistemological and political agenda for an emotional geopolitics of fear that I forward here uses the concept of conscientization (conscientização), which was first used by the Brazilian radical educator Paulo Freire (1972) to describe the development of critical consciousness from within. He originally applied it to students for whom education was crucial in challenging their marginalised status, with the goal of revolutionary liberation. The term has since been taken up more widely, and beyond critical pedagogy, for example into participatory action research in geography (see Kindon et al 2007) . Importantly in the context of the arguments here, conscientization may describe a theory, a method or a process of social change (as, in radical pedagogy, these are not separated).
My call for an emotional geopolitics of fear combines all three of these strands. The first concerns the nature of analysis; the need to reconceptualize the relationship between emotions and global issues in a way that challenges the hierarchical, procedural scaling of emotions that characterises much work on the war on/of terror. Looking outside the academy, we can see that fear and hope are already being used to counter the metanarrative of globalized fear and the increasingly oppressive and unjust policies which the war on/of terror has led to in the west. These actions may be conscientized and conscious, planned, or of the moment. How we analyse and incorporate emotion into geopolitics partly depends on how we understand the scaling and relations involved in geopolitics. Here, I am building on Koopman's (2008) notion of 'alter-geopolitics', which describes new proposals and practices that seek to challenge hegemonic geopolitics and create new geopolitics. Koopman's emphasis is on grassroots movements that build international relations of solidarity. Activist struggles and new coalitions that are emerging in response to terror, hate crimes and community fears materialise varied geographies of hope (Ahmad 2002; Oslender 2007; Weber 2006; Wright 2008 ) . We can add to this people's strategies for resisting or contesting globalized fear in everyday life (Pain et al 2008) , and practices that bridge racial and religious difference that have been described as everyday cosmopolitanism (Noble 2009 ).
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued for the development of an emotional geopolitics of fear as one tool to understand, reposition and respond to accounts of 'globalized fear'. 
Notes
1 This paper avoids ethnocentric shorthands such as '9/11', '11-M' or '7/7' for specific terrorist attacks on western targets.
2 The 'war on terror' which was declared by George Bush after the 2001 New York attacks is equally considered a war of terror by many left scholars. As Cowan and
Gilbert (2008) argue, fear is central to its operation: as well as being a war on terrorism it has been, ostensibly, a war to protect from fear, in reality one which must invoke fear to succeed. They also discuss the ways in which the US regime governs through terror. 6 'Global' in this context, as for globalized fear, also means 'western': for example, the standard for 'global' excellence within Anglo-American geography is to be well known, circulated and cited within Anglo-American geography.
